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1 
 
Security Agendas and International Law: the case of new 
technologies 
 
NIGEL D. WHITE 
 
You will not apply my precept,’ he said, shaking his head. ‘How often have I said 
to you that when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however 
improbable, must be the truth?1 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
‘Security’ as a concept would provide a serious challenge to Sherlock Holmes in terms of 
detecting any definite meaning, any core of truth within it. In terms of the international legal 
order, ‘security’ is not viewed as a legal principle but is seen as the ‘primary’ purpose of the 
principal inter-governmental organisation of the post-1945 legal and political order.2 It is 
worth considering the relevant provisions of the UN Charter in greater detail because they 
contain within a tension between security and justice, by placing security (partly) within the 
framework of international law. Article 1 of the Charter declares that the purposes of the UN 
are: 
 
1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective 
measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the 
suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about 
by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international 
law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead 
to a breach of the peace; 
                                                          
1 Sherlock Holmes to Doctor Watson in A Conan-Doyle, The Sign of Four (London, Penguin, 1982) 51, 
emphasis in original. 
2 Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion) [1962] ICJ Rep 151 at 168 where the Court stated 
that ‘the primary place ascribed to international peace and security is natural, since the fulfilment of the other 
purposes will be dependent upon the attainment of that basic condition’. 
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2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of 
equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate 
measures to strengthen universal peace; 
3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an 
economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character, and in promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and 
4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these 
common ends.  
 
International lawyers tend to focus their attention on the principles of the UN Charter 
contained in Article 2, which include principles applicable to the UN, of sovereign equality 
and non-intervention, and duties upon states, primarily the obligation to settle disputes 
peacefully and the duty to refrain from the threat or use of force. However, article 1(1), is 
important for international law more broadly because it sets the UN the task of pursuing 
peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with international law but, read literally, it does 
not subject the UN’s collective measures taken to tackle threats to, or breaches of, the peace 
to the same legal framework. The prospect of UN security action unbound by international 
law runs like a red line through the Charter: the principle that the UN should not intervene in 
domestic affairs does not prejudice action taken by the Security Council under Chapter VII.3 
The ban on the use of force allows for only two exceptions – self-defence against an armed 
attack and military action taken to combat threats to and breaches of the peace as authorised 
by the Security Council under Chapter VII.4 The content of the Charter seems to favour 
‘security’, especially the collective coercive type found in Chapter VII, over ‘law’.  
The achievement of peace and security is the raison d’etre for the establishment of the 
UN, and international law is instrumental or secondary to that. However, paragraphs 2, 3 and 
4 of Article 1 contain the basis for the development of a much more impressive legal 
architecture that could, potentially, provide a robust framework for security action by placing 
both the development of self-determination of peoples and the promotion of respect for 
individual human rights as purposes of the UN, alongside the achievement of peace and 
security. Within the human rights legal framework subsequently created by the UN in 
                                                          
3 Article 2(7) UN Charter 1945. 
4 Articles 2(4), 51 and 42 of the UN Charter 1945. 
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instruments and treaties that followed the Charter,5 freedoms and rights are curtailed by 
considerations of security, both national and human. While security was born free in 1945, it 
has gradually been shackled by legal constraints. However, those shackles are not strong 
enough to prevent the Security Council from behaving as if it remained unbound by 
international law.   
Rather than focus this chapter on the Security Council, a topic covered in detail in 
many books and articles,6 the focus will be on the shifting ground of security agendas and 
those communities established to deliver them. The chapter then considers whether this has 
involved the application or development of international laws to constrain potential threats, 
using the example of new technologies. Essentially, the chapter reviews whether, in the 21st 
century, the UN tackles new security threats in an executive manner through the Security 
Council, or whether it has (also) addressed these issues through legal frameworks and 
constraints.  The relationship between security and law is one that is played out at all levels, 
from local, to national, to regional and then international. It is a delicate one – too greater 
emphasis on security erodes rights and freedoms and may lead to despotism, while too 
greater emphasis on law may prevent action necessary to tackle existential threats. 
In the 1960s, international lawyers had come to view the ‘harnessing of technology by 
public international institutions’ as opening ‘encouraging prospects for the control and 
direction of social change’. However, that view has changed so that today ‘technology is no 
longer seen predominantly as promise but often rather a threat’ and, furthermore, concern is 
widespread that the ‘ability of public international organizations to manage technological 
change has been very limited’.7 New technologies seem to be a long way ahead of specific 
legal regulation, especially at the international level where consensus is difficult to achieve, 
and yet, without such regulation, they represent possible threats to peace and security when, 
with effective legal controls, they have the potential to enhance both peace and security.  
 
II. THE PROLIFERATION OF SECURITY AGENDAS 
 
                                                          
5 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217 A(III) and the 
International Human Rights Covenants of 1966. 
6 Eg V Lowe, A Roberts, J Walsh and D Zaum (eds), The United Nations Security Council and War (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2010); ND White, ‘The Security Council, the Security Imperative and International 
Law’ in M Happold (ed), International Law in a Multipolar World (Abingdon, Routledge, 2012) 4. 
7 M Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002) 512. 
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Drawing on the work of the Copenhagen School, ‘security’ can be best understood as the 
absence of existential threats against states, other security actors, peoples and individuals.8 
The development of international relations to encompass ‘collective security’ and ‘human 
security’ has not meant that ‘state security’ is no longer important. What it does mean is that 
we have different, often competing, conceptions of security. Realist understandings of state 
or national security have prevailed for much of the twentieth century. The focus of Realism is 
on the safety of the nation-state, which results in placing national interests over collective 
interests and, thereby, national security over both collective security and human security, 
unless they coincide.9 The Realist vision of security is still strong and has survived the Cold 
War confrontation between two heavily armed superpowers. Several factors can be pointed to 
explain its survival. Firstly, states clearly still represent threats to other states, particularly 
those possessing nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Secondly, 
what were once mainly domestic threats, such as terrorism, have become transnational and, 
more generally, globalisation has led to internal security-focused politics becoming 
increasingly externalised.10 This means that national security issues are increasingly played 
out on a global scale, as evidenced by the terrorist attack on the United States of 11 
September 2001 that led the US to wage a ‘war on terror’, more specifically a war against al-
Qaeda, impacting around the globe (as shall be seen below when ‘drone wars’ are 
considered).   
Nonetheless, despite the continuing strength of national security, the concept of 
security has not only widened to include non-military threats, such as those arising from food 
or environmental insecurity, but has also deepened to encompass human security.11 Richard 
Falk defines ‘security’ in a very ‘human’ way as the ‘negation of insecurity as it is 
specifically experienced by individuals and groups in concrete situations’.12  The focus of 
international debate is increasingly on human security, which has been defined to include 
‘economic, environmental, social and other forms of harm to the overall livelihood and well-
being of individuals’.13 Clear evidence of the widening understanding of security is found in 
the pivotal post-Cold War UN Security Council summit held in January 1992. As an organ 
                                                          
8 B Buzan, O Waever and J de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1998) 
5. 
9 H Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (A Knopf, 1972) 973. 
10 P Hough, Understanding Global Security (Abingdon, Routledge, 2008) 2. 
11 ibid 8. 
12 R Falk, On Humane Governance: Toward a New Global Politics (Polity, 1995) 147. 
13 FO Hampson, ‘Human Security’ in PD Williams (ed), Security Studies: An Introduction (Abingdon, 
Routledge, 2008) 229, 231. 
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that is built on Realist foundations, requiring agreement amongst its five permanent members 
(China, France, Russia, UK, and USA) for any substantive decision, the UN Security Council 
had hitherto almost exclusively concerned itself with state and military security. However, at 
its summit it declared that the ‘absence of war and military conflicts amongst States does not 
itself ensure international peace and security’ and that ‘non-military sources of instability in 
the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace and 
security’.14 
As noted by Don Rothwell, the ‘traditional view of security defines it in military 
terms with the primary focus on state protection from threats to national interests’. However, 
with the end of the Cold War, ‘security discourse has expanded beyond the traditional 
military domain with the proliferation of security agendas including economic security, 
environmental security, food security, bio-security, health security and human security’.15 As 
identified by Hitoshi Nasu, during the Cold War ‘national security from external military 
attacks and threats was recognised as the ultimate raison d’etre of sovereign states’.16 The 
Security Council supplemented this with the concept of international security in the post-Cold 
War period, evidenced by its authorisation to coalitions of willing states, starting with 
Coalition action against Iraq,17 to undertake military actions to deal with threats to and 
breaches of international peace.  
Attempts to understand security as a fixed concept fail to capture the securitisation of 
many aspects of daily life. Rather, security should be understood, according to the 
Copenhagen School, as a ‘shared understanding of what is considered a threat’.18 As Ronald 
Dannreuther explains, this reflects the turn towards ‘constructivism’ in the theorisation of 
security ‘with its focus on subjective ideas and intersubjective understandings’, which 
‘accords a greater weight of how ideas and perceptions influence and structure international 
reality’.19 The constructivist approach of the Copenhagen School shifts ‘attention away from 
an objectivist analysis of threat assessment to the multiple and complex ways in which 
security threats are internally generated and constructed’.20 Furthermore, the Copenhagen 
                                                          
14 UNSC ‘Security Council Summit Statement Concerning the Council’s Responsibility in the Maintenance of 
International Peace and Security’ (31 January 1992) UN Doc S/23500. 
15 DR Rothwell, KN Scott and AD Hemmings,  ‘The Search for Antarctic Security’ in AD Hemmings, DR 
Rothwell and KN Scott (eds), Antarctic Security in the Twenty-First Century: Legal and Policy Perspectives 
(Abingdon, Routledge, 2012) 3.  
16 H Nasu, ‘Law and Policy for Antarctic Security’ in Hemmings et al, ibid, 19. 
17 UNSC Res 678 (29 November 1990), UN Doc S/RES/678 (1990). 
18 ibid 25; Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (n 7), 23-6. 
19 R Dannreuther, International Security: The Contemporary Agenda (Polity, 2007) 40. 
20 ibid 42. 
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School moves the study of security away from the narrow confines of the Realist neo-
scientist ‘rationally calculating the multiple security threats’, towards a more democratic 
construction of security based on shared understandings found in organisations, governments, 
civil society and other non-state actors, including individuals.21 
The Copenhagen School identifies those objects that are existentially threatened as 
‘referent objects’.22 The referent object for security has ‘traditionally been the state and, in a 
more hidden way, the nation’. This signifies that ‘for a state, survival is about sovereignty, 
and for a nation, it is about identity’. However, following the constructivist approach, 
‘securitising actors can attempt to construct anything as a referent object’.23 For the 
Copenhagen School, the ‘referent object’ is traditionally the state, although with new security 
agendas developing all the time the object can be collective concepts, such as the 
environment or regions, such as Antarctica, and this is reflected in the UN Security Council’s 
expansion of the concept of threat.24 These ideas are very helpful in understanding the fact 
that security has expanded, although it remains largely state-centric, and that it is best viewed 
through a constructivist lens as being founded on inter-subjective understandings within 
legitimate fora, such as the UN Security Council, UN General Assembly, and regional 
organisations, such as the OAS, AU, EU, Arab League and ASEAN.  
 
III. SECURITY COMMUNITIES AND THE ACHIEVEMENT OF AGREEMENTS 
 
In 1957, Karl Deutsch, having considered various historical arrangements of states that had 
succeeded in removing conflict within their membership, defined a ‘security community’ as 
‘one in which there is a real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each 
other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way’. He went on to say that ‘if 
the entire world were integrated as a security-community, wars would be automatically 
eliminated’. By integration, he did not mean amalgamation into one state, rather the 
attainment of a ‘sense of community and of institutions and practices strong enough and 
widespread enough to assure, for a long time, dependable expectations of peaceful change’.25 
‘Whenever states become integrated to the point that they have a sense of community’ there 
                                                          
21 ibid. 
22 Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (n 7) 36. 
23 ibid. 
24 Nasu (n 15) 25-6. 
25 K Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of 
Historical Experience (Greenwood, 1957) 5-6. 
44 
 
is ‘assurance that they will settle their differences short of war’.26 Community building is a 
product of ‘shared understandings, transnational values and transaction flows’ and, once 
established, a security community generates stable expectations of peaceful change.27 
Although the UN collective security organisation has not approached Karl Deutsch’s 
concept of a security community, evidenced by the continuation of regular and frequent 
conflicts in the post-1945 world order, it has helped humankind to achieve the basic condition 
of any security community – survival.28 There is evidence that the UN emerged from the 
Second World War as a form of ‘security community’ in order to consolidate the hard won 
peace by continuing the alliance that had defeated Germany and Japan. Ian Brownlie 
considered that the prosecution of the Second World War by the Allies against the Axis 
powers went beyond collective defence and became a war of sanction, the purpose of which 
was to remove a danger to world peace by extirpating the source of aggression. He stated that 
such a war of sanction in the UN period no longer has any place unless it is an ‘organized 
community action’. Indeed, Brownlie views the prosecution of the Second World War as 
linking into the creation of the United Nations, even though the organisation was not formally 
created until the War’s end, as the ‘majority of states entered the war against the Axis Powers 
on the basis of the United Nations Declaration of 1942 and the Moscow Declaration of 
1943’.29 Following this line of argument, a security community was constituted in 1945 when 
the UN was established, but its origins can be traced back to 1942 when the Allied powers 
proclaimed themselves the ‘United Nations’ not only to defend themselves from Axis 
aggressors, but to defeat them completely and then shape a global peace.30 
The UN certainly was a much improved collective security organisation when 
compared to the League of Nations, with the founding states of the UN collectively giving the 
smaller ‘executive’ or ‘governing body’, the Security Council of 15 states (increased from 11 
in 1965), ‘primary responsibility’ in the realm of restoring or maintaining international peace 
and security.31 The Security Council’s powers are specified under Chapters VI and VII of the 
UN Charter, with the former containing a range of recommendatory powers in relation to the 
peaceful settlement of disputes or situations that might endanger the peace, including fact-
                                                          
26 E Adler and M Barnett, ‘Security Communities in Theoretical Perspective’ in E Adler and M Barnett (eds), 
Security Communities (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998) 4.  
 27ibid 4-6. 
28 Deutsch (n 24) 3. 
29 I Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 7th edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008) 332-3. 
30 But see JW Wheeler-Bennett and A Nicholls, The Semblance of Peace: The Political Settlement After the 
Second World War (Macmillan, 1972) 528-53.  
31 Article 24(1) UN Charter. 
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finding and recommending methods of adjustment or terms of settlement.32 The powers 
contained in Chapter VII to demand provisional measures, such as cease-fires, to take a range 
of non-forcible measures, including economic sanctions, and to take military action,33 are 
contingent upon the Council making a determination of a ‘threat to the peace’, ‘breach of the 
peace’ or ‘act of aggression’.34 The Security Council has adopted an expansive interpretation 
of ‘threat to the peace’ to include not only threats of force and threats to inter-state security, 
but also to cover internal violence and conflicts that have the potential to spill over into 
neighbouring states, as well as threats from terrorists and pirates.35 
The concentration of power in the hands of the Security Council has led to a 
continuing debate as to where competence lies, if at all, if the Council is unable to act due to 
collective inaction or, as was the case during the Cold War, due to the pernicious use of the 
veto. While the voting rules of the Security Council were an improvement on the 
requirements of unanimity in the League of Nations’ Covenant,36 they still require consensus 
within the P5.37 
The veto was so prevalent during the Cold War, cast primarily by the Soviet Union 
(who used its veto 77 times in the first 10 years of the UN) and later by the US, that the UN 
was often reduced to a bystander (as during the war in Vietnam 1959-75) or, at best, to a 
forum for diplomacy between the superpowers (for example during the Cuban Missile Crisis 
of 1962). The veto is evidence that the Security Council was not fashioned as an automatic 
‘instrument of action’ rather, as Inis Claude pointed out, its basic function is as a forum for 
negotiation and diplomacy.38 It follows that it is fallacious to argue that the UN had failed 
simply because it was unable to take action against the US and Soviet Union during the 
Cuban Missile Crisis. The UN still served as a forum for negotiation between the two 
superpowers, enabling both to climb down from their position of near nuclear confrontation. 
If the Council fails to fulfil even its basic function as a forum for diplomacy, then it can be 
argued that it has not carried out its primary role for the maintenance of international peace 
                                                          
32 Articles 34, 36, 37, 38 UN Charter. 
33Articles 40, 41, 42 UN Charter. 
34 Article 39 UN Charter. 
35 For example UNSC Res 1373 (28 September 2001) UN Doc S/RES/1373 (2001) re terrorism; and UNSC Res 
1846 (2 December 2008) UN Doc S/RES/1846 (2008) re piracy. See generally C Henderson, ‘The Centrality of 
the United Nations Security Council in the Legal Regime Governing the Use of Force’, in ND White and C 
Henderson (eds), Research Handbook on International Conflict and Security Law (Elgar, 2013) 120. 
36 Article 5 Covenant of the League of Nations 1919. 
37 Article 27(3) UN Charter requires decisions to be ‘made by an affirmative vote of nine [originally seven] 
members including the concurring votes of the permanent members’. 
38 I Claude, ‘The Security Council’ in E Luard (ed), The Evolution of International Organization (Thames and 
Hudson, 1966) 83-8. 
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and security, as placed upon it by the UN Charter,39 and authority must therefore pass to 
another security community, either to the UN General Assembly or, arguably, to established 
and competent regional security organisations. 
Having outlined security agendas and communities, this chapter now considers how 
the advent of new technologies has affected security and how the UN has responded to these 
developments by helping to shape a normative framework for regulating new technologies 
and for dealing with any emerging threats. At this stage, it should be reiterated that the 
response to new technologies should be a combination of normative development (by the 
General Assembly and other norm-making bodies within the UN) and executive action 
dealing with immediate existential threats. Although that executive action is not confined to 
responding to breaches of international law, the legitimacy of such action is enhanced if it 
does indeed amount to an enforcement of existing law.    
  
IV. THE UN AS A SECURITY COMMUNITY ON NEW TECHNOLOGIES 
 
Bearing in mind that a security community is not simply concerned with creating a normative 
framework within which to tackle disputes and threats, nonetheless it is surprising that, in 
general terms at least, the UN has struggled to produce a normative framework for new 
technologies. In other areas of international relations, UN soft law, in the form of 
declarations, has eventually led to UN hard law, in the form of binding treaties. This has 
happened in human rights law, environmental law and, to a more diffuse extent, arms control 
law, but we see little of this development as regards new technologies, for example on the 
issue of cyber security. It is not that the UN is unaware of the issue – in 1999, for instance, 
the General Assembly adopted a resolution calling upon states to ‘promote at multilateral 
levels the consideration of existing and potential threats in the field of information security’ 
and went on to invite states to inform the Secretary General on the advisability of ‘developing 
international principles that would enhance the security of global information and 
telecommunications systems to help to combat information terrorism and criminality’.40 The 
cagey language of this resolution reflects a profound disagreement between the membership 
of the UN, specifically within the P5 of the Security Council. As related by Mary Ellen 
O’Connell, Russia has promoted a treaty along the lines of the Chemical Weapons 
                                                          
39 Article 24(1) UN Charter. 
40 UNGA ‘Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international 
security’ Res 53/70 (4 December 1998), UN Doc A/RES/53/70. 
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Convention to regulate cyberspace, which it viewed as a similar dual use issue – ‘Russia’s 
proposed treaty would ban a country from secretly embedding malicious codes or circuitry 
that could be later activated from afar in the event of war’. The US, however, differed in its 
approach following the success of the Stuxnet worm cyber-attack on Iran.41  
It is difficult to construct a treaty or other legal regulatory mechanism that governs 
something as complex and multidimensional as the use of cyberspace. Achieving consensus 
on something that can be seen both as an important modern form of freedom of information 
and as a threat to security is one of the greatest challenges facing the UN.  The item on 
‘developments in the field of information and telecommunication in the context of 
international security’, first placed on the agenda of the General Assembly in 1999, has 
remained there as an annual item, though little progress has been made. In 2010, the General 
Assembly identified that there were a number of existing and potential threats in the field of 
information security. The Assembly urged states to develop ‘strategies’ to address ‘threats 
emerging in the field, consistent with the need to preserve the free flow of information’. 
Intriguingly, the Assembly also considered that the ‘purpose of such strategies could be 
served through further examination of relevant international concepts aimed at strengthening 
the security of global information and telecommunications systems’. The Assembly went on 
to invite states to look at the recommendations contained in the Report of the Group of 
Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications 
in the Context of International Security, in particular both the aforementioned ‘concepts’ as 
well as ‘measures’ that might be taken to strengthen information security.42 Unfortunately, 
the Report did not develop the ‘concepts’ that might constitute a normative framework to 
shape the use of cyberspace. States’ responses to the Assembly’s request contain some 
discussion of relevant ‘concepts’. The Australian government stated that ‘existing 
international law provides a framework for protection from information security threats 
arising from a variety of actors’, mentioning a range of existing international legal principles 
applicable to the use of cyberspace (sovereign equality, the prohibition on the use of force 
and international humanitarian law), but admitted that greater discussion among states was 
necessary to refine the scope of applicability of these principles to threats emanating from the 
cyber realm.43 The United States stated that principles of the jus ad bellum and jus in bello 
were applicable, while the UK used the more modern terminology of the law governing the 
                                                          
41 ME O’Connell, ‘Cyber Security without War’, (2012) 17 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 187, 205-6. 
42 UNGA Res 65/41 (8 December 2010) UN Doc A/RES/65/41. 
43 UN Disarmament Study Series 33, ‘Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunication in the 
Context of International Security’ (UN, 2011), 22-23. 
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use of force and armed conflict.44 A further Governmental Expert Group Reports has 
followed,45 but with a similar lack of content that does not address the suggested limitations 
in state responses to laws governing the use of force and armed conflict. Such an approach 
narrowly confines security threats to cyber-warfare in a literal sense, when many non-kinetic 
cyber-operations and cyber-crimes do not reach that level and yet may still constitute security 
threats. 
One problem is to convert new understandings of threats to security into legal 
concepts, principles and rules that together will shape a legal regime, the purpose of which is 
to enable organisations and states, and other security actors, to address such threats. One of 
the barriers to this is the way international law is divided into subject areas. New technologies 
raise concerns as a cross-cutting issue of security in a number of areas. General principles and 
specific norms from various specialist areas of international law may be applicable: arms 
control law, human rights law, international humanitarian law and international 
environmental law, to name the most obvious.  However, when new technologies are used to 
destabilise states, such as cyber-attacks on another state’s internet capabilities, as happened in 
Estonia in 2007, specialist legal regimes give way to discussions revolving around general 
principles of international law, such as non-intervention,46 which can have limited traction in 
international affairs. Furthermore, the problems of identifying the origins of such attacks, 
moreover, of attributing such attacks in terms of state responsibility, adds to the problems of 
regulation. The strict rules on attribution of acts of private individuals to states, as embodied 
in the Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts of 2001,47 as 
well as in the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice,48 do not assist in inducing 
states to stop the acts of private individuals that interfere in the security of other states. 
However, more recognition should be given to the underdeveloped general principle of due 
diligence found in international law, initially raised by the International Court of Justice in 
the Corfu Channel case in 1949 when it pointed to ‘every State’s obligation not to allow 
                                                          
44 ibid 35-6, 56. 
45 UNGA Res 68/243 (27 December 2013) UN Doc A/RES/68/243; UN Doc A/68/98 (2013) paras 16-25. See 
further UN Doc A/66/359 circulated at the request of the Permanent Representatives of China, the Russian 
Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, containing a draft international code of conduct for information security, 
which was subsequently co-sponsored by Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. 
46 R Buchan, ‘Cyber Attacks: Unlawful Uses of Force or Prohibited Interventions?’, (2012) 17 Journal of 
Conflict and Security Law 212. 
47 Article 8 of which states that ‘the conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered as an act of 
State under international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under 
the direction or control of, that State in carrying out that conduct’. 
48 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) 
(Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, 62-4; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) (Merits)  [2007] ICJ Rep 43, para 406. 
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knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States’.49 At least this 
establishes that states have some positive obligations to prevent cyber-attacks being launched 
from their territories against other states, even though the territorial state might not be behind 
the attack. 
Furthermore, within the UN there are a number of ‘security communities’: the ‘hard’ 
security community of the Security Council, with its mixture of executive and legislative 
competences; the ‘softer’ human rights focused competence of the General Assembly; and 
the specialist organs and regimes on matters such as disarmament, telecommunications, 
space, air  and human rights. Often then, as regards new technologies, there is a lack of a 
clear UN ‘security community’ within which inter-subjective agreement can be forged.  
More broadly, the role of science and technology in the context of international 
security and disarmament was added to the General Assembly’s disarmament agenda in 
1988. In introducing a draft resolution in the First Committee, the Indian delegate, in a 
remarkably prescient speech, recounted that increasing resources were being devoted to 
developing new weapons systems, such as the graduated use of nuclear explosive power, 
miniaturisation and large-scale computing capabilities, and fuel and laser technology, all of 
which were all transforming the security environment. He stated that because of these 
technological developments, work should be initiated to develop a shared perception of the 
problems involved and to make concerted efforts to resolve them.50 
Thus, the UN had the opportunity at the outset of the upcoming Revolution in 
Military Affairs (RMA),51 unleashed towards the end of the Cold War, to put in place some 
soft law. It must not be forgotten that the UN had responded to earlier technological 
revolutions by creating enduring legal regimes for airspace (following the huge growth of 
civilian aviation at the end of the Second World War)52 and outer space in the 1950s and 
1960s (in response to the launch of the first Sputnik satellite by the USSR and the imminent 
large scale utilisation of outer space).53 
                                                          
49 Corfu Channel Case (UK v Albania) (Merits) [1949] ICJ Rep 4, 22. 
50 UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, ‘The Role of Science and Technology in the Context of International 
Security and Disarmament’ http://www.un.org/disarmament/topics/scienceandtechnology/. 
51 See generally CS Gray, Strategy for Chaos: Revolution in Military Affairs and the Evidence of History 
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Unfortunately, the UN General Assembly did not seize the opportunity. The 1988 
Assembly resolution requested that the Secretary General follow future scientific and 
technological developments, especially those which had potential military applications, to 
evaluate their impact on international security and to submit a report on this to the Assembly 
in 1990.54 The Report of the Secretary General of 1990 was a product of meetings, reports 
and a conference involving scientific and other experts. It consisted of a general overview of 
technological advances and their implications for international security. Mention was made of 
‘mini-nukes’, laser and particle beams, space technology, materials technology, information 
technology and biotechnology, but all of these were seen as ‘evolutionary and largely 
incremental’ rather than revolutionary.55 In other words, these technological developments 
were viewed as developments of existing technologies and, therefore, the implication was 
that there was adequate existing regulation. Reference was made in the Report to existing 
arms control treaties, but little analysis of their inadequacies or gaps between them was made, 
which is suggestive of a lack of legal expertise in the compilation of the Report. Bearing in 
mind that the Report came at the end of the Cold War, the opportunity to start shaping new 
law was lost. Some statements in the Report show that new technologies or new 
developments in existing technologies would prove to be problematic, especially in the area 
of information technology, which was seen as ‘extraordinarily pervasive technology’ that 
could be harnessed by the military sector. ‘Advanced computers’, ‘artificial intelligence’ and 
‘robotics’ were all envisaged in the Report, but their potential negative impacts were not 
considered, although the positive ones in terms of disarmament verification were.56 The 
Assembly simply took note of the Report and vowed to give the matter on-going attention.57 
The matter remains on the UN agenda, but normative development has not occurred. 
In 2007, the Assembly adopted a resolution that expressed concern about the development of 
unilateral export control regimes emplaced to prevent the export of dual use goods and 
technologies, which tend to impede the economic and social development of developing 
countries, urging the development of multilateral ‘non-discriminatory guidelines for 
international transfers of dual-use goods and technologies and high technologies with military 
applications’. There was no consensus on this resolution.58 
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There is no doubt that outside the highly charged atmosphere of the UN’s political 
organs, the UN does significant work on identifying and analysing new technologies. For 
example, the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) has looked at existing legal 
frameworks for cyber war.  A report by Nils Meltzer on ‘Cyberwarfare and International 
Law’ in 2011 is a good example, although the legal focus is again restricted to the jus ad 
bellum and the jus in bello. Clearly, these are important areas of law which, as Meltzer 
concludes, mean that ‘the phenomenon of cyberwarfare does not exist in a legal vacuum, but 
is subject to well established rules and principles’.  He goes on to say:  
 
That being said, transposing these pre-existing rules and principles to the new domain of 
cyberspace encounters certain difficulties and raises a number of important questions. 
Some of these questions can be resolved through classic treaty interpretation in 
conjunction with a good measure of common sense, whereas others require a unanimous 
policy decision by the international legislator, the international community of states.59 
 
Meltzer perhaps understates the problem here – while the rules regulating the use of force and 
conduct of warfare may be applicable to cyber operations, they fail to capture their essence 
and, therefore, a great deal of cyber threats are not caught by those frameworks since they 
neither constitute the use of armed force nor are used in wartime. Thus, while the cyber 
operations that occurred during the Russian intervention in Georgia in 2008 were probably 
covered by the jus in bello and jus ad bellum, those conducted against Estonia in 2007 were 
not.  The cyber operations of the type used against Estonia are more likely to be the norm 
than those conducted as an aspect of a military operation.  
Although the jus ad bellum and jus in bello are important areas of law that act as 
possible constraints on what can be called cyber-warfare, the regulation of cyberspace at 
levels falling short of war, use of force, or armed conflict remains to be achieved. At this 
level, one might expect the legal framework to be centred on human rights law as the use of 
cyberspace not only raises security concerns, but also concerns about freedoms of thought, 
opinion and expression, and the rights to association and privacy. The way human rights law 
is structured, however, leads to problems of extraterritorial application of protection when a 
state interferes with the rights of citizens in another state. The UN Human Rights Council 
adopted a resolution on ‘the promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the 
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internet’ in 2012, which affirmed that the ‘same rights that people have offline must also be 
protected online, in particular freedom of expression, which is applicable regardless of 
frontiers and through any media of one’s choice’ in accordance with common Article 19 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 and International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights 1966.60  
The UN General Assembly has also concerned itself with the use of the internet, but 
mainly from the perspective of inequality between developed and developing states in terms 
of access to and usage of the internet – what it terms a ‘digital divide’.61 Other UN agencies 
(for example the ITU, UNESCO) have the internet on their agenda, but from a more 
specialised or technical angle.62 Little of this helps us to tackle the fact that freedom of 
expression, although guaranteed by human rights norms, can, by the very terms of human 
rights treaties, be subject to restrictions that are provided by law and necessary for the 
protection of ‘national security’.  
In its 1988 General Comment on Article 17 International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (right to privacy) the Human Rights Committee stated that to be lawful 
interference with the right, the relevant national legislation must ‘specify in detail the precise 
circumstances in which such interferences may be permitted’.  Furthermore, a ‘decision to 
make use of such authorised interference must be made only by the authority designated 
under the law, and on a case-by-case basis’.63 This indicates that the sort of blanket covert 
surveillance of email and SMS messages undertaken in recent times by the US and UK is not 
in conformity with Article 17. Such jurisprudence has not stopped the massive trawling of 
internet traffic by the US (the National Security Agency’s  Prism Operation) or UK (GCHQ’s 
Tempora Operation), nor, even more worryingly, does it appear robust enough to state clearly 
that such interference is unlawful. Both states have defended their actions as being lawful on 
the basis that they are necessary and proportionate counter-terrorism measures. This can be 
seen as an argument for ‘security’ prevailing over ‘human rights’ or, more accurately, that 
human rights are qualified and not absolute and allow for ‘security’ to be taken into 
consideration, but such arguments have to be tested and should not be accepted at face value. 
                                                          
60 A/HRC/RES/20/8, 5 July 2012, adopted without a vote. See also A/HRC/RES/12/16, 2 Oct 2009, adopted 
without a vote. 
61 UNGA Res 66/184, 22 December 2011, UN Doc A/ UN Doc A/66/184, adopted without a vote. But see 
broader Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion or 
expression on the Internet UN Doc A/66/290  (2011); also UNGA Res 68/167 (18 December 2013) UN Doc 
A/RES/68/167, on the right to privacy in a digital age. 
62 ibid. 
63 Human Rights Committee GC 16, 8 April 1988, para 8. Interference, to be justified, also has to be 
‘proportionate’ and ‘necessary’, Antonius Cornelis Van Hulst v Netherlands, HRC 2004, para 7.8 and 7.10.  
53 
 
 
V. DRONES, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE UN 
 
With the odd exception, such as the regulation of outer space, international law tends to 
develop as a reaction to change. In this way it might be anticipated that new non-kinetic 
technologies that can be used to disable computer networks, or to carry mass covert 
surveillance of e-mail traffic, may take decades to bring within a clear legal framework, 
depending on how quickly states come to realise that it is in their mutual self-interest to 
effectively regulate cyber-space. It may, in any case, prove to be an impossible task as it 
raises the question of whether states can actually regulate something that has escaped the 
confines of sovereignty – it may simply be too late to put the genie back into the bottle.  In 
this scenario, states will fall back on general principles of international law, such as the norm 
prohibiting intervention in a state’s political or economic affairs, which will not prevent cyber 
operations but will enable selective condemnation in the General Assembly and, 
occasionally, executive responses to particular threats by the Security Council. 
However, when it comes to new technologies that seem to provide straightforward 
improvement in military efficacy, such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), commonly 
known as drones, it should be expected that existing international law will be adequate. 
Indeed, this is quite commonly the argument made in the literature, given that drones are seen 
as mere ‘platforms’ for the launch of weapons such as missiles and not new weapons per se.64 
Furthermore, drones are portrayed by their users and supporters as upholding the value of 
security rather than undermining it.65  Nonetheless, the increasing use of drones does raise 
security concerns for a number of reasons. When they are used for surveillance they are 
potential threats to personal security and privacy. When used for targeting purposes they not 
only raise security concerns for civilians potentially caught in the blast (the problem of 
collateral losses), but they also seem to either extend the battlefield, thereby bringing the 
instability inherent in war, or constitute the extraterritorial application of force for the 
purposes of some extreme form of law enforcement. Under this model of law enforcement, 
capture, arrest and trial are replaced by summary execution.  All of these conceptions of 
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drone use challenge the notion that they represent a new era of clean, clinical and legitimate 
use of force. 
Drones are being increasingly used for surveillance, normally as part of domestic law 
enforcement operations. As with the exponential growth of surveillance cameras generally, 
the usage of drones is accepted as a benign and acceptable form of security. As is oft-stated 
by politicians and law-abiding citizens, ‘if you’re not doing anything wrong, there is no 
reason to object’ to such surveillance.66 Indeed, it is possible to see such measures as 
upholding basic rights. Both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 
and the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 guarantee the ‘right to liberty and 
security of person’.67 Surveillance in order to stop crime, especially violent crime, can be 
argued to be an aspect of a government’s positive duties to prevent human rights violation 
and provide security. Indeed, there is plenty of jurisprudence that allows the state a wide 
margin of appreciation for secret surveillance, as a measure ‘necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of national security’,68 provided that there are measures in place to 
prevent abuse.69 Nonetheless, this conception of security can lead to a very intrusive state 
where the prioritisation of security in all aspects of life erodes other rights and freedoms 
expected in a democratic society, for example, the right to privacy.70 The European Court of 
Human Rights has provided a general definition of privacy, which should raise concerns 
about the growing use of state surveillance, including by drones. According to the Court, 
privacy includes a ‘zone of interaction of a person with others, even in a public context, 
which may fall within the scope of “private life”’. In addition, the Court opined that a 
‘person’s reasonable expectations as to the privacy may be a significant, though not 
necessarily conclusive factor’ to be considered when determining whether a person’s private 
life is affected by measures taken outside a person’s home or private premises.71 
Despite this tentative protection of public spaces from state intrusion, it must be born in 
mind that a margin of appreciation is found within the definitions of the rights themselves. 
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For instance, in protecting the right to a ‘private life’ the European Convention goes on to 
declare that ‘no interference with the exercise of this right’ by the government is permitted 
except ‘in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security, public safety or economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of 
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of rights and 
freedoms of others’.72 Perceptions and assertions of security by governments are difficult for 
the courts to resist, particularly in times of terrorism that are characterised by random attacks 
against civilians, even when government actions to protect the lives and security of its 
citizens may appear to tread on the very freedoms it is fighting to protect. Due diligence 
obligations upon governments are obligations of conduct, rather than result, and so a failure 
by government to prevent specific acts of terrorism is not necessarily an indication that the 
state has failed to fulfil its duties under human rights law. The random nature of many 
terrorist actions means that it is very difficult to prevent each and every one. When 
considering how these obligations have been interpreted by the Human Rights Committee in 
the context of the rights to life and security under the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights,73 it is clear that states must take reasonable and appropriate measures to 
protect individuals within their jurisdiction who are subject to known threats to their lives.74 
The European Court of Human Rights has similar jurisprudence, stating in one judgment that 
a government that ‘knew or ought to have known … of a real and immediate risk to the life of 
an identified individual or individuals from the criminal acts of a third party’, must take 
‘measures within the scope of their powers, which, judged reasonably, might’ be ‘expected to 
avoid that risk’.75  As has been stated in reviewing this jurisprudence: 
 
Applying this jurisprudence by analogy to terrorist attacks creates some challenges: the 
bombing of civilians on aircraft or commuter trains and the hijacking of aircraft 
suggests a random choice of victims, rather than the selection of an ‘identified 
individual or individuals’ as victims.76 
 
When drones are used outside of a state’s jurisdiction, whether for surveillance or for 
targeting purposes, and when lethal force is used against individuals, the human rights issues 
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become more complex. While human rights obligations apply to individuals within a state’s 
territory, there is considerable debate about when they apply to individuals outside its 
territory but, arguably, within its jurisdiction. When considering the use of armed force from 
a drone against a terrorists suspect, the question is whether the individual is within the 
jurisdiction of the state using force. Although there is some Inter-American case-law that 
supports the application of the right to life in these circumstances,77 there is contrary 
European jurisprudence.78 Rather than considering whether the state using force has enough 
control over the targeted individual for the purposes of evaluating whether there is an 
assertion of jurisdiction in these circumstances, it would be better for the Courts to focus on 
the fact that the operator of the drone, often a distance away from the target, is clearly under 
the control of the state using force.79 
If jurisdiction is established, such uses of targeted force from drones, when taken 
outside of armed conflict, are violations of the right to life as there is usually no imminent 
threat to the state to justify its use of force as a last resort.80 Indeed, the use of lethal force 
from drones seems to be an extreme and, paradoxical as it may sound, unlawful version of 
law enforcement where it is easier to kill suspects than to capture them (particularly as 
capturing suspects would put them clearly within the capturing state’s jurisdiction).81  
Furthermore, the use of drones for targeting suspected terrorists appears to be an 
attempt to externalise a state’s security measures to counter terrorism by taking out targets in 
another state’s territory before they have chance to hit the drone state’s territory or nationals. 
The US has tried to justify this by arguing what is the ultimate justification for using lethal 
force – that there is a global armed conflict against terrorists or, at the very least, a 
transnational armed conflict against Al Qaeda and its associates. This argument is an attempt 
to justify a lower standard for when lethal force can be used as, in simple terms, a use of 
lethal force is allowed in an armed conflict if the target is either a military objective, a 
combatant, or a civilian who is directly participating in hostilities, and the anticipated 
collateral damage (‘incidental loss of civilian life’) is not excessive in relation to the expected 
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military advantage.82  The US has interpreted these rules liberally: to carry out ‘signature’ 
strikes on the basis that the targeted individual is performing suspicious activities; to target 
funerals where there is a concentration of Taliban leaders; to target drug lords (who are 
criminals not combatants); and sometimes to order strikes outside of a conflict-zone, for 
example, in Yemen in 2002 and again in 2011.83 
It seems that after the devastating attacks on the US of 11 September 2001, 
governments (and not just the US) have re-assessed their security priorities, have reasserted 
national security (often on the basis that this is the best way to protect human security) and 
have acted in violation of basic norms governing when coercion can be used by the state 
against individuals to protect the majority of its citizens. This has either been as a result of the 
extension of the battlefield or the extension of law enforcement. While the majority of states 
may support this, or, more accurately, remain supine in the face of these erosions, the 
securitisation of post-9/11 life has meant that (the right to) security has been elevated to a 
pre-eminent position in political rhetoric and action in contradistinction to its position as one 
of a number of human rights and protections provided by international law.84 
Thus, while there are international norms applicable to drone use, a great deal of it is 
underdeveloped, indeterminate or ineffectual. The UN itself has not tackled drone usage in 
any meaningful way. Although this is probably to be expected in the executive body, it is 
disappointing to see that the plenary body has also failed to fulfil its functions as a security 
community with the ability to shape normative frameworks, confining itself instead to 
exhortation in general resolutions to the effect that counter-terrorism efforts by states should 
be undertaken in conformity with international human rights law, refugee law and 
international humanitarian law.85 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
The UN system has confronted the issue of new technologies since the late 1980s, but has 
made limited progress on either consolidating applicable law or developing new laws and 
mechanisms. The fact that new technologies bring in aspects of many areas of policy and law 
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– arms control, human rights, conflict, peace and security – means that specific frameworks 
need to be shaped by the UN Security Council, General Assembly, Secretary-General and 
other UN bodies. The uncertainty as to how to accommodate different security agendas 
within the framework of international law produces its own insecurity, so that we are caught 
in what appears to be a spiralling security dilemma in which one state’s uncensored increase 
in security measures leads another state to increase theirs to a point where they feel more 
secure, which, in turn, leads the first state to further increase their security preparation. 
Clarification of the applicable law and law-making can, of course, take place outside the UN, 
but as such it will be uneven, piecemeal and will lack the universality and legitimacy that the 
UN brings. The ever-growing use of cyber measures and drones are just two examples of how 
technology is outstripping law.  We make not be able to determine the truth as to the legal 
meaning of ‘security’ in a logical Holmesian manner, but we should be able to achieve 
agreement on what it means in the case of new technologies. 
 
